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Abstract  
We test whether voters are rational in the sense that their decision to cast a vote 
depends on its expected impact on the election outcomes. We provide causal 
evidence on this rational voting hypothesis by using exogenous variation in 
pivotal probabilities that arise at population thresholds determining council sizes 
in Finnish municipal elections. First, we document statistically significant, 
economically relevant and robust effects of crossing the threshold on turnout. 
Second, we use simulations to measure the pivotal probabilities. Finally, we use a 
novel instrumental variables design to show that the changes in the pivotal 
probabilities rather than simultaneous changes in the number of available 
candidates or their quality explain the changes in turnout. Moreover, we 
document that turnout responds only to such pivotal probabilities that are salient 
to the voters, and that the effect of district magnitude on the election closeness in 
general or the proportionality of elections is not behind the response in turnout. 
Thus, the rational voter exists. 
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1. Introduction 
The expected instrumental benefits of voting are often thought to be close to zero, because 
the probability that a vote has an effect on the election outcome is typically close to zero (e.g. 
Grofman 1993 and Blais 2000). Moreover, the act of voting incurs non-negligible costs such 
as the opportunity cost of time. Therefore, if voters are rational in the sense that they only 
vote when the benefits of voting exceed the costs, the turnout rates should be very low in 
most elections, and particularly so in large elections.1 Yet, we observe relatively high turnout 
rates across countries and various elections, and it is not clear that turnout responds to the 
closeness of elections (e.g., Grofman 1993). This voting paradox (Downs 1957) has long 
puzzled political scientists and economists and continues to do so. 
Various explanations for the paradox have been offered both within and outside the rational 
voting paradigm. A simple way to explain the empirical patterns of high turnout is to 
introduce an additional utility component by assuming that voters derive utility from the act 
of voting itself, irrespective of the election outcome. This expressive component may include 
elements such as identity, duty or social pressure. Indeed, there is convincing empirical 
evidence that such expressive motives matter (e.g., Gerber et al. 2008 and Funk 2010). 
The purpose of our study is to analyze whether the instrumental components of the rational 
voting model also matter for the decision to vote or abstain. Empirical analysis of the 
relationship between turnout and how close the elections are is complicated due to standard 
endogeneity issues. In particular, reverse causality is an inherent issue in such studies, 
because pivotal probability depends on turnout. Moreover, numerous unobservable candidate, 
                                                      
1 This hypothesis is, however, somewhat debated. Mulligan and Hunter (2003) show that the simple empirical 
frequency of pivotal vote is one out of 89,000 in U.S. Congressional elections. Gelman et al. (1998) discuss 
estimating these rare events and find that the pivotal probability is at best one out of 1 million for close U.S. 
national elections. Even though these are small numbers, the expected incremental benefit is not necessarily 
small if voters have social preferences (e.g. Edlin et al. 2007). Moreover, once aggregate uncertainty is 
introduced, also the pivotal probabilities are larger than usually thought (Myatt 2012).    
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voter and constituency characteristics may influence both turnout and how close the election 
is. Furthermore, it is not always easy to measure the pivotal probabilities, especially in 
proportional elections. In this paper, we solve both the issues of measurement and causal 
inference. 
To overcome these challenges for causal inference, we utilize a natural experiment to analyze 
if turnout increases when the probability of one vote making a difference increases 
exogenously. In our quasi-experiment, we utilize population discontinuities in Finnish local 
government elections to construct a regression discontinuity design (RDD). In Finland, 
municipal council size is an increasing step function of population. This step function is 
determined by law. Therefore, we compare otherwise similar municipalities with different 
council sizes.  
In a proportional open-list election system, pivotal events are relatively common. They can 
occur both between parties, i.e., situations where one abstaining voter could change the 
allocation of seats between parties by voting, and within parties, i.e., situations where one 
voter could change which of the party’s candidates gets the last seat of the party. In this 
setting, an increase in the amount of seats leads to an increase in the probability of a vote 
being pivotal, ceteris paribus. The effect arises from various sources, but most importantly 
simply from the elections allocating the last seats with a smaller amount of votes and thus 
smaller margins both between and within parties. According to our bootstrap election 
simulations, crossing the threshold, where council size increases, increases the probability of 
pivotal occurrence between parties for the average party on average by about 18% (from 1.7 
times out of a hundred to 2.0, see Table 2) and the probability of pivotal occurrence for the 
last seat within parties for the average candidate increases on average by about 17% (from 2.4 
times out of a hundred to 2.8). 
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In the absence of precise manipulation of the municipal population, the treatment of 
increasing the council size is almost as good as random near the population thresholds. 
Therefore, this setup provides a valid causal test for the effect of council size on turnout. We 
find that turnout is higher just above the council size thresholds than just below. This result is 
robust to standard validity and robustness checks involved with RDD. One particular placebo 
test is especially convincing – here we use the same RDD to explain municipal level turnout 
in the national parliamentary elections where these thresholds play no role. We find that 
crossing the same thresholds has no effect on turnout there. 
The main caveat of our natural experiment design in making conclusions about rational 
voting from the council size effect is that pivotal probabilities are not the only things that 
change at the thresholds. On the contrary, the relationship between turnout and district 
magnitude can arise from many sources. From the voter perspective, council size affects also 
proportionality (i.e. the minimum vote share required for getting elected) and hence 
potentially political efficacy, because voters may perceive that less votes are wasted (see e.g. 
Gallego et al. 2012, Karp and Banducci 2008). Also parties may respond to changes in 
political competition (i.e. closeness of elections in a more general sense that just one vote 
making a difference) and hence induce elite mobilization (Powell 1986), which may be 
reflected in campaigning and candidate placement. Indeed we observe that the number of 
candidates and their quality change at the discontinuities.2 Besides a further impact of more 
and better candidates on the pivotal probability (vote distribution may be flatter), this may 
                                                      
2 In Finland, the maximum allowed size of each party list is a deterministic function of a council’s size (1.5 
times the council size). Moreover, parties and potential candidates may respond to an increase in council size by 
presenting a longer list, even when the limit is not binding. Indeed, when our RDD is used on candidates, we 
observe that the number and type of candidates is different above the threshold than below it. Fortunately, this is 
the only confounding policy that uses any of our thresholds. For example, municipalities’ responsibilities do not 
depend on any population thresholds. We discuss potential confounding responses by candidates and parties in 
Section 4 along with our empirical strategy. 
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also influence turnout due to some expressive components.3 Since RDD identifies only the 
joint effect of all the events that take place at each threshold, we cannot be sure whether the 
voters react to the pivotal probabilities or to e.g. the number of candidates. Fortunately, we 
are able to analyze this question of real causal channel in detail using a novel design.  
Our test of rational voting involves three steps. First, we document the overall effect of 
council size on turnout. Second, we simulate the pivotal probabilities for each municipality-
party both within and between parties. There are many attempts in the literature that test for 
rational voting by correlating some measures of expected closeness of elections to turnout 
(see e.g. Geys 2006 for a survey). One fundamental issue with such studies is that the real 
pivotal probability is highly nonlinear in relation to typical closeness measures such as 
margin of victory and the relationship is context dependent, e.g. 1% vote share victory 
margin may be either very far or very near to one vote being decisive (Cox 1988). We solve 
these measurement issues by bootstrapping pivotal occurrences.     
Finally, we use our measure of expected pivotal probability simultaneously with the other 
endogenous variables in an instrumental variables regression (IV), where the different 
thresholds are the instruments. We find that the number or quality of candidates has 
consistently no significant effect on turnout, but that the pivotal probability has a positive and 
significant effect. Moreover, we find that turnout responds only to the more salient within-
party pivotality but not at all to the - harder to calculate - between-party pivotality. These 
results also largely rule out proportionality and elite mobilization as explaining the turnout 
response, because they are mainly between party concerns and also relate to political 
competition in general rather than to the influence of a single voter. Nonetheless, we also 
                                                      
3 For example, in the spirit of spatial models of voting (e.g., Downs 1957), voters may find a better match for 
their preferences. Moreover, more candidates may mean more available information, which may decrease the 
costs of voting (e.g., Matsusaka 1995). More candidates could also imply more campaigning.  
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subject our measures of pivotality, general closeness of elections and proportionality to a 
horse race and show that only pivotality affects turnout.  
This approach of using multiple thresholds to uncover and quantify the real causal channel at 
work at the thresholds in RDD is an interesting applied methodological contribution. 
Previous approaches to disentangle multiple treatments from each other in RDD with 
multiple thresholds have included focusing only on such ‘clean’ thresholds which affect only 
one of the treatments (see e.g. Ferraz and Finan 2009) or using variation in treatment timing 
by combining RDD with a difference-in-differences analysis (so called difference-in-
discontinuity approach as first coined by Grembi et al. 2012).4 We provide a new alternative 
that requires, first, in the case of, for example, two simultaneous treatments A and B, there to 
be some threshold(s) where treatment A has a large intensity (but treatment B only small) and 
some other threshold(s) were treatment B has a large intensity (but treatment A only small), 
and second, that there are at least as many thresholds as endogenous variables (simultaneous 
treatments). Therefore, we contribute to the emerging econometrics literature on the analysis 
of multiple cutoffs RDD (Eggers et al. 2015b, Cattaneo et al. 2015a). 
Understanding whether voting is rational, in the sense that voters take into account the 
probability of their vote making a difference in elections, is important for various reasons. 
First, it is important to understand whether a central activity in a democratic society is outside 
the realm of rational behavior in this strict sense. Second, understanding the correct 
underlying model of voting is essential for implementing policies aimed at affecting turnout 
and thus political representation. Third, there are some views (e.g., Fiorina 1989, Green and 
Shapiro 1994 and Aldrich 1997) that turnout or the paradox of voting is proof against rational 
                                                      
4 See also a recent survey and critical review of studies using multiple population thresholds in RDD by Eggers 
et al. (2015b) whose concerns we carefully address. 
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choice theory in general and thus challenges many models in social sciences. While there are 
convincing theoretical counterarguments (e.g., Myatt 2012), causal empirical evidence of 
rational voting has largely been missing. 
2. Theoretical framework and prior empirical evidence  
The classic rational voting model (e.g., Downs 1957 and Riker and Ordenshook 1968) can 
easily be derived from a choice tree, where the decision is between voting and not voting and 
the two outcomes under both alternatives are the preferred candidate (or party) getting elected 
or not. In this discrete choice model, standard utility comparison calculus leads to the 
following model: 
(1) ܻ = 1(ܩ + ݌ܤ − ܥ > 0), 
where Y = 1 if voter votes and zero otherwise, 1 denotes an indicator function, G denotes the 
outcome independent utility from voting. This is the expressive component, which was not 
present in the original model by Downs (1957). C is the cost of voting. B is the benefit of 
preferred election outcome and p=p1-p2, where p1 is the probability that the preferred 
candidate will get elected if the voter votes, and p2 is the probability that the preferred 
candidate will get elected if the voter does not vote. In this model, p vanishes as the set of 
voters gets larger. Therefore, with positive C, only large G can explain large turnout in large 
elections. 
Obviously, the existence or importance of G in the voting decision does not imply 
irrationality as such. The pure expressive (or irrational) utility model assumes that p does not 
matter even if it is not very small. Therefore, the p component is at the heart of the rationality 
in these models. At its simplest, the expressive utility voting model can be presented as 
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(2) ܻ = 1(ܩ > ܥ). 
This would imply that a statistical test based on the pB component would be able to separate 
between the rational and expressive voting hypothesis. On the contrary, showing that voters 
respond to the costs of voting does not allow differentiating between rational and expressive 
models. 
However, the testing also has to account for the possible strategic behavior of voters. Since p 
depends on how many of the other potential voters actually vote, the decision to vote is 
strategic. Even if G = 0, one would expect some amount of turnout due to p getting larger the 
fewer of the other potential voters turn out (see e.g. Palfrey and Rosenthal 1983 and 1985). If 
voters differ in G or C, pure strategy equilibria exist that can be presented by threshold values 
in (G - C). In that scenario, only voters with high (G - C) participate.5 Therefore, game theory 
models may result in very similar empirical predictions to the expressive models where all 
hinges on G. This makes testing for rationality difficult: High or low turnout alone is not 
sufficient to infer the correct voting model.  
There are plenty of alternative explanations for voting behavior in the literature and we do 
not cover them all. Explanations include a behavioral explanation of voters inflating their 
individual p’s (Riker and Ordenshook 1968), and group voting where individuals are 
ethically obliged to a group and groups coordinate (first mentioned by Harsanyi 1955, 
empirical evidence by Coate and Conlin 2002). In addition, uncertain voter models (e.g., 
Matsusaka 1995 and Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996, 1999), where the costs of voting have 
                                                      
5 If all voters are identical, they play mixed strategy equilibrium that leads to some positive level of turnout that 
is decreasing in population. However, empirical regularities imply that population characteristics matter to 
turnout and that to a large extent the same people vote in sequential elections (e.g., Matsusaka and Palda 1999). 
This implies that mixed strategies are not typically used. 
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an endogenous relationship with the information available to voters on candidates, have been 
found to be empirically relevant in explaining turnout (Degan and Merlo 2011). 
We use a natural experiment to estimate the causal effect of p on Y at an aggregate level. 
Thus, this analysis does not explicitly allow us to distinguish between alternative theories 
where pivotal probabilities play a role such as individually rational model or group voting 
model. However, we do show evidence that rational behavior with respect to the likelihood of 
changing the election outcome is a significant driver of the decision to vote, thus ruling out 
pure expressive models where none of the voters respond to the closeness of elections. 
Some attempts to uncover the relation between Y and p have been made previously in both 
political science and economics. The evidence is mixed. For example, Geys (2006) reports in 
a survey article that 69% of the reviewed articles support the rational voting hypothesis, i.e., 
turnout responds to closeness of the elections. Foster (1984) also surveys many of these 
attempts and conducts such an analysis herself. Those results are also mixed. Unfortunately, 
all of these results are partial correlations and reveal no causal results. Among many others, 
Indridason (2008) deals with some endogeneity issues by focusing on run-off elections, but 
not to the extent of mimicking randomization. The main limitation of the run-off elections 
approach is that the first round election outcome is not exogenous either.  
Coate et al. (2008) calibrate the parameters of a rational voting model using real data from 
small elections and then simulate the election outcomes. They find that although the patterns 
in the real data match the patterns in their simulation with respect to how turnout responds to 
the size of the elections, the margins of victory do not. This leads them to reject the rational 
voting model.  
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Natural experiments have been used previously to analyze other aspects of voting behavior. 
Andersen et al. (2014) show that by using a natural experiment in simultaneous elections for 
different offices, turnout responds to larger stakes (increasing B). While this can be seen as an 
indirect test of voters also responding to p, it is also possible that B is also partly determining 
G. Funk (2010) studies implementation of postal voting in Switzerland in a difference-in-
differences estimation framework. She finds that the causal effect of removing social pressure 
from voting decisions on turnout (decreasing G) was larger than the effect of reduction in 
voting costs (decrease in C), especially in small communities. Fujiwara (2011), Lago (2012), 
Kawai and Watanabe (2013) and Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2016) provide causal evidence 
that some voters are strategic, i.e. given that voter participates, the decision who to vote for 
accounts for the pivotal probability concerning electing different candidates. 
3. Institutional setting 
In Finnish local government elections, voters elect the municipal councils. These elections 
are very important for several reasons. First, municipalities are responsible for the majority of 
public services in Finland, including health care and primary education. The GDP share of 
municipality spending is roughly 18 percent and they employ around 20 percent of the total 
workforce, whereas the central government share is only roughly five percent. Second, the 
municipalities are not heavily regulated in how they collect their income and they can also 
independently decide how to provide many of the public services. For example, they can 
freely set the income tax rate, which is the largest revenue source. Third, municipal councils 
are the main seat of power in municipal decision-making. Compared with many other 
countries, mayors or city managers do not wield much power in Finland, nor are they elected 
but are rather civil servants chosen by the council. Fourth, in most municipalities the 
probability of a vote being pivotal is fairly high, due to a relatively high number of council 
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seats per capita and other details of the election rule, such as the open-list property and a 
multi-party system. Therefore, the pivotal occurrence rate is substantial and quite high on 
average, even in larger municipalities. Thus, we are able to observe significant responses in 
pivotality to the exogenous variation in council size. 
Another important feature of the Finnish system is the large number of municipalities relative 
to the population, with a large variation in municipal population size. The largest 
municipality is the country’s capital, which has over half a million inhabitants, whereas the 
smallest mainland municipality has roughly 800 inhabitants. The median municipal 
population is less than 6,000. Finland is also sparsely populated and population density varies 
substantially across municipalities, as do other population characteristics such as age 
structure and income. Thus, we have significant variation in our forcing variable (population) 
and the political preferences of the population. This influences the distribution of votes and 
thus we have a large variation in pivotal occurrences and turnout, even within municipalities 
of the same size. 
Finland has a multi-party system. Currently, there are eight parties in the Finnish parliament 
and these parties also dominate municipal politics, but some local single-issue groups exist as 
well. For example, in the 2004 municipal elections the three largest parties (the Social 
Democrats, the Centre Party and the National Coalition) received around 68 percent of the 
votes with roughly similar overall shares but with large variation in shares between 
municipalities. 
The municipal council is responsible for strategic and financial outlines and the main 
objectives of municipal activities. The council also chooses a municipal board which has a 
preparatory role. The composition of the board is based on party shares in the council, i.e., 
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each party in the council gets seats in the municipal board according to its share of council 
seats. Thus, there is no real opposition in local politics. This is important, because the 
majority of votes for some party is not the only relevant dimension where a single vote could 
have a meaningful impact. For the implemented policies, every seat potentially counts.  
The elections in our data were held in the October of 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012. The 
Election Day was the same for all municipalities. No other issues are voted upon at the same 
time. The councils are elected using an open-list system. Each voter gives a single vote to a 
single candidate. Voters cannot vote only for a party without selecting a candidate. Individual 
votes rank the candidates within the parties. Thus, there are potentially pivotal events within 
parties. The total number of votes for all of the given party’s candidates determines the 
number of votes for the party. The seats are allocated between parties based on the D’Hondt 
comparison method.6 Therefore, there are also potentially pivotal events between parties. 
Each municipality has only one electoral district. 
Council size is a step function of the municipality’s population and it is determined by law.7 
Table 1 shows the amount of municipalities in different population groups with different 
council sizes. In Table 1, we show this distribution only up to a population of 45,000, because 
after that the data are not dense enough for RDD and are thus omitted from our analysis. As 
can be seen from Table 1, council size in our data varies from 13 for some municipalities 
with a population of 2,000 or less, up to 51 for municipalities with a population of between 
30,000 and 45,000. This concave step function implies that there is large variation in the 
amount of council seats per capita. 
                                                      
6 The candidates of each party in the municipality are ordered according to their votes and they are given 
comparison numbers calculated by dividing total votes for the party in the municipality first by 1, then by 2, 
then 3 etc. Council seats are allocated to the candidates with the highest comparison numbers. 
7 The council sizes for the different population groups are: population less than or equal to 2,000 (council size 
13, 15 or 17), 2,001–4,000 (21), 4,001–8,000 (27), 8,001–15,000 (35), 15,001–30,000 (43), 30,001–60,000 (51), 
60,001–120,000 (59), 120,001–250,000 (67), 250,001–400,000 (75) and over 400,000 (85). 
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Table 1. Population groups, council size and number of elections in data (population < 45,001). 
Population Council seats N 
<2000 17 (or 15 or 13) 274 
2001-4000 21 465 
4001-8000 27 478 
8001-15000 35 307 
15001-30000 43 168 
30001-45000 51 55 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
The purpose of this section is to present our empirical approach. The analysis consists of 
three steps. First, we estimate the impact of council size on turnout in local elections using 
regression discontinuity design. The second step is to measure the pivotal probability, i.e., the 
probability that one vote changes the outcome of the election. The third step is the analysis of 
mechanisms behind the overall effect of council size on turnout, in particular, showing that 
change in the pivotal probability at the thresholds is behind the effects on turnout rather than 
alternative responses at the thresholds. To achieve this we outline an instrumental variables 
approach where the first stages consist of regression discontinuity designs and identification 
is based on the fact that different thresholds have different effects on the various endogenous 
variables. Therefore, we argue that our empirical analysis provides a test of whether the 
likelihood of a pivotal vote affects turnout in local elections.  
4.1. Step 1: The effect of council size on turnout 
The basic idea of our empirical strategy is to compare turnout in municipalities below and 
above the cut-off points. The main identifying assumption in such RDD is that individuals 
cannot precisely manipulate the forcing variable (see e.g. Lee and Lemieux 2010). This 
should be true in our case, because municipalities do not self-report their population. In this 
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case, identification is based on a local randomization at the threshold.8 Ideally, we would 
have many data points close to the threshold and then estimate the effect at the threshold. In 
our case, due to lack of observations and having multiple thresholds, we need to use 
specifications that use data points further away from the thresholds. More specifically, we 
estimate both parametric polynomial regressions and nonparametric local linear regressions. 
We prefer the parametric ones because they lend themselves more easily to the analysis with 
multiple thresholds and the instrumental variable approach, but show that in our particular 
case, the parametric specification produces similar results as the more flexible nonparametric 
approach.9 
We estimate a regression model of turnout on a set of zero-one indicators for being above a 
cut-off point and include a flexible but smooth function of population as control variables. 
The population variables pick up the impact of all determinants of turnout correlated with 
population, apart from council size. Hence, we will obtain a reliable estimate of the effect of 
council size on turnout clean of confounding factors that might otherwise bias our estimates. 
A further complication to our analysis is how to deal with multiple thresholds. One option 
would be to calculate the forcing variable as a population distance to the nearest threshold 
and simply define a single group for being above a threshold. We do not use the pooling 
option for two reasons. First, unless the share of identifying observations around each 
threshold would be the same (which would happen in large samples due to local 
randomization), we could be comparing, for example, a municipality of a population of 1,999 
(just below) to a municipality of 30,001 population (just above). This is clearly not a valid 
                                                      
8 Local randomization is not a requirement but rather one possible interpretation of RDD. What is required is 
that other covariates develop smoothly over the threshold. One difference between these two perceptions is that 
the latter allows there to be trends in the other covariates. See Cattaneo et al. (2015b) for further discussion. 
9 In general, it is not advised to use parametric specifications, see e.g. Imbens and Gelman (2014) for the many 
issues with the parametric approach. 
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comparison. Therefore, given a relatively small sample, this sort of normalization and 
pooling is not recommended. Second, we want to allow for different effects at different 
thresholds. This will be important in our instrumental variables method, where we have more 
than one endogenous variable. Therefore, we will estimate a model with the actual population 
as the forcing variable and then allow for a different effect at different thresholds. We will 
calculate the overall average effect as the weighted (by the number of observations around 
each threshold) average of these separate effects. 
Our main specification is a parametric model where we simply fit a high order polynomial of 
population over the whole range of population and include dummy variables for groups 
defined based on council size. We estimate by OLS the following equation 
(3)			ܶݑݎ݊݋ݑݐ௜௧ = ߚଵ + ߚଶܩݎ݋ݑ݌2௜௧ +	…+ߚ଺ܩݎ݋ݑ݌6௜௧ 	+ ݂(ܲ݋݌௜௧) + ݑ௜௧.  
The dependent variable is the turnout in a municipality i in an election year t. Function f is a 
polynomial of population. We use 1st – 7th order polynomials. The explanatory variables of 
interest are overlapping dummies Group2,…,Group6, indicating all municipalities above a 
certain threshold. For example, Group 2 includes all the municipalities with a population of 
more than 2,000.10 Our estimating sample contains data from the first six groups, because we 
limit the analysis to municipalities with a population of less than 45,000 to keep the data 
somewhat dense. The respective group coefficients β2,…,β6 give direct estimates of the effect 
on turnout of increasing council size by one step. The group dummies can be interpreted as 
individual treatment variables, with the previous group as the control group. Therefore, this 
specification allows for a different effect at each threshold.  
                                                      
10 Non-overlapping dummies would produce the same fit of the model, but we prefer the overlapping dummies, 
because the related coefficients have directly our desired interpretation.  
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One drawback of Model 1 is that it uses data far from the cut-offs to estimate the value of the 
polynomial at the cut-off. Therefore, we introduce slightly more flexible models as a 
robustness checks. Our second approach relaxes the specification by allowing for different 
polynomials between different cut-offs. Our Model 2 is written as 
(4)  			ܶݑݎ݊݋ݑݐ௜௧ = ߚଵ + ߚଶܩݎ݋ݑ݌2௜௧ +	…+ߚ଺ܩݎ݋ݑ݌6௜௧ + ଵ݂(ܲ݋݌௜௧)  
+ܩݎ݋ݑ݌2௜௧ ∗ ଶ݂(ܲ݋݌௜௧ − 2000) + ⋯+ ܩݎ݋ݑ݌6௜௧ ∗ ଺݂(ܲ݋݌௜௧ − 30000) + ݑ௜௧. 
Here the function f is a 1st to 3rd order polynomial of population and is allowed to vary 
between the cut-off groups. Note that already a linear specification maps turnout quite 
flexibly to the population. Normalizing population to zero at the cutoff when estimating 
functions f2,…, f6 implies that, like in Model 1, the coefficients β2,…, β6 on the dummies for 
groups above the cut-offs give direct treatment effect estimates of interest.  
As a third approach, we estimate nonparametric local linear regressions using triangular 
kernel. We report these results for various bandwidths, including the Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal ones. We conduct these estimations separately for the each 
threshold and verify that the parametric approaches give very similar results at each 
threshold. Therefore, we feel confident in using the inflexible parametric approach (3) as the 
main specification.  
The identifying assumption of our models is that other determinants of turnout develop 
smoothly with respect to population and are therefore captured by the f function. Factors 
outside the model depending on the same population rule would violate this assumption. Ade 
and Freier (2011) and Eggers et al. (2015b) have raised this concern especially related to the 
case of analyzing population thresholds, since in many countries, municipalities’ 
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responsibilities, grants, politicians’ salaries and regulation depend also on the same 
thresholds. In that case, there are simultaneous exogenous treatments and RDD is able to only 
identify their joint effect. None of these concerns is present in the Finnish system. However, 
in addition to the number of seats, the maximum number of candidates allowed for each party 
also changes at the cut-offs. More candidates could affect turnout if people find it easier (or 
harder) to find a suitable candidate from a larger pool. Moreover, also candidate quality can 
respond to a change in council size.11 Finally, district magnitude also affects the closeness of 
elections more generally as well as the proportionality of the elections. In order to isolate the 
effect of seats from the other effects, we conduct an instrumental variables (IV) analysis that 
we describe in detail in Step 3.12 Before we can proceed to IV, we need to be able to measure 
the pivotal probabilities. 
4.2. Step 2:Measuring pivotal probabilities 
We calculate the pivotal events both between parties, i.e., situations where one abstaining 
voter could change the allocation of seats between parties by voting, and within parties, i.e., 
situations where one voter could change which of the party’s candidates gets the last seat of 
the party. A pivotal event takes place both in the case of actual draws (in which case a lottery 
would determine who gets elected) and also when giving one more vote creates a draw or a 
different seat allocation directly. 
Kotakorpi et al. (2013) develop the bootstrap sampling method that we use as a basis for our 
simulation. They use this method to define close elections (lucky and unlucky candidates) at 
an individual level in the proportional election setting to study the causal effect of being 
elected on returns to office. We have an entirely different purpose. The basic idea of the 
                                                      
11 See e.g., Cox (1997) or Fiva and Folke (2015) for analysis of strategic entry of candidates. 
12 Simply controlling for all the other things changing at the cutoffs is not satisfactory, because they are 
alternative response variables, and therefore ’bad controls’. 
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simulation is that the sampling procedure allows us to mimic the randomness involved in 
voters’ decisions on whether to vote at all and who to vote for. For example, changes in the 
weather conditions may make a difference on which voters give their vote, and some voters 
may be sick one day and others another day, etc. 
We sample votes with replacement for each candidate, so that the sampling probability of a 
vote for a particular candidate is the share of all votes that he or she received in the real 
elections. We sample as many votes as were originally given in the real elections. Each 
sampling produces a new distribution of votes among the candidates, while on average 
maintaining the original distribution of votes. After each sample, we take note of a pivotal 
event after each repetition. We repeat this exercise 1,000 times and count the share of times a 
pivotal event occurred for each party-election (between parties) and each candidate-election 
(within parties) observation. Thus, this is a bootstrap procedure for a particular non-standard 
statistic of the vote distribution, the pivotal vote probability. The simulation produces almost 
continuous variables between zero and one that are good measures of the probability of a 
pivotal event between and within parties.  
We show in the Online Appendix A Tables A1 and A2 using counterfactual simulations that 
our measure works as intended and jumps at the cutoffs in the expected way, that is, it jumps 
much at the smaller thresholds and less at the larger. Besides showing that crossing the 
threshold has a significant impact on the pivotal probability, our simulations are essential in 
providing a metric that can be used to analyze whether the effect of council size on turnout is 
due to increases in pivotal probability at the thresholds or due to other changes at the 
threshold. To get the metric that we use in the IV, we conduct a counterfactual simulation, 
where we construct measures of pivotal probabilities that do not include the effects of 
crossing the threshold on turnout. This counterfactual is needed to correctly measure the 
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effect of crossing the threshold on expected pivotality at the first stage of IV. In other words, 
the counterfactual corrects for the bias arising from simultaneity between turnout and 
pivotality. We accomplish this by manipulating the turnout. We use equation (3) and regress 
turnout on 1-7th order polynomials of population, election year dummies and the cut-off 
group dummies. Then we subtract from the resulting fit the effects of the group dummies on 
the fit. We use this adjusted fit as the counterfactual turnout that determines the number of 
votes given in our counterfactual simulations. 
We stress that our measure of pivotality is not a measure of closeness of elections in any 
more general sense. We measure the incidence of cases were a single vote would make a 
difference. In contrast, elections where, for example, 3 votes would make a difference to the 
seat allocation could be seen a close, but would not count as pivotal in our metric. We can 
also construct a simple metric for the closeness of elections, or the victory margin. In the 
within party dimension were votes rank the candidates, this is simply the distance in personal 
vote share to the within party threshold of getting elected. For this metric we use the same 
threshold as Kotakorpi et al. (2013) defined as the mean votes of the elected candidate with 
the least votes and the non-elected candidate with the most votes. In our IV estimation we can 
test whether the response in turnout is explained by this within party margin of victory or by 
the within party pivotality. Between party margins of victory are harder to measure in PR 
systems (both to voters, parties, candidates and researchers), but it turns out that we do need 
study that confounder, because only the within party pivotality dimension matters for voters. 
4.3. Step 3:Identifying the causal mechanisms 
In our IV regression, we estimate the main RDD equation (3) in the first stage. The first 
endogenous variable (the first stage outcome) is the simulated counterfactual pivotal 
probability. As the second first stage outcome we use the number of candidates and their 
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quality is the third. We assume that incumbency status is a sufficient metric for candidate 
quality. This assumption is based on Eggers et al. (2015a) who show that incumbency status 
captures all other observable candidate quality measures relevant for voters. The fourth 
variable is the proportionality measured as the minimum vote share among the elected 
candidates in the municipality. Other observables are shown not to jump at the threshold and 
therefore not considered endogenous (see Table B3, discussed later).  
We conduct this estimation both at the election and election-party level. Therefore, we want 
to measure also pivotal probability at the election (or election-party) level. In order to achieve 
this aggregation, we take a weighted (by respective vote shares) average over both the within 
party pivotal probability (measured at the candidate level) and the between parties pivotal 
probability (measured at the party level) to calculate the probability that a randomly drawn 
voter would be pivotal in a given election. We use either a single measure for pivotality, 
which is simply the sum of these weighted between and within pivotalities, or both of them 
separately. These measures along with the other endogenous variables are described in Table 
2 at both municipal and party level. For the pivotal probabilities we report the counterfactuals 
based on a 6th order polynomial specification similar to Model 1. Differences to descriptions 
in Table A1 arise mainly from the weighting.  
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Table 2. Describing endogenous variables in IV. 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Election level 
Pivotality 1746 0.063 0.031 0.006 0.193 
Number of candidates 1746 84 48 14 305 
Share of incumbents 1746 0.26 0.07 0.12 0.71 
Proportionality 1746 0.014 0.007 0.002 0.052 
Panel B: Party-election level 
Pivotality, within 10171 0.006 0.009 0.000 0.164 
Pivotality, between 10171 0.020 0.020 0.000 0.130 
Number of candidates 10171 14 13 1 76 
Share of incumbents 10171 0.21 0.17 0 1 
Proportionality 8656 0.018 0.011 0.002 0.158 
  
In the second stage, we use the fits of the first stages to explain turnout. In other words, we 
perform an IV regression of turnout on simulated pivotal probability, the number and type of 
candidates and proportionality using the threshold dummies as the excluded instruments. The 
estimation equations are written as 
(5)		 
1st	stage:		ܲ݅ݒ݋ݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௜௧ = ߚଵ + ߚଶ ܩݎ݋ݑ݌2௜௧ +	…+ߚଷ ܩݎ݋ݑ݌6௜௧ 	+ ݂(ܲ݋݌௜௧) + ݑ௜௧. 
1st	stage:		ܰݎ݋	݋݂	ܿܽ݊݀݅݀ܽݐ݁ݏ௜௧ = ߜଵ + ߜଶܩݎ݋ݑ݌2௜௧ +	…+ߜ଺ܩݎ݋ݑ݌6௜௧ 	+ ݂(ܲ݋݌௜௧) + ݒ௜௧ 
1st	stage:		ܳݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ	݋݂	ܿܽ݊݀݅݀ܽݐ݁ݏ௜௧
= ߠଵ + ߠଶܩݎ݋ݑ݌2௜௧ +	…+ߠ଺ܩݎ݋ݑ݌6௜௧ 	+ ݂(ܲ݋݌௜௧) + ݎ௜௧ 
1st	stage:		ܲݎ݋݌݋ݎݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ݅ݐݕ௜௧ = ߢଵ + ߢଶܩݎ݋ݑ݌2௜௧ +	…+ߢ଺ܩݎ݋ݑ݌6௜௧ 	+ ݂(ܲ݋݌௜௧) + ݇௜௧ 
2nd	stage:		ܶݑݎ݊݋ݑݐ௜௧
= ߛଵ + ߛଶܳݑ݈ܽଓݐݕ	݋݂	ܿܽ݊݀ଓ݀ܽݐ݁ݏప௧෣ +	ߛଷܰݎ݋	݋݂	ܿܽ݊݀ଓ݀ܽݐ݁ݏప௧෣
+ ߛସܲଓݒ݋ݐ݈ܽଓݐݕప௧෣ + ߛହܲݎ݋݌݋ݎݐଓ݋݈݊ܽଓݐݕ෣ +݂(ܲ݋݌௜௧) + ݁௜௧ 
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Despite substantial effort, we have not been able to find any policies, other than the number 
of seats and candidates, using the same thresholds in Finland. Neither did Pettersson-Lidbom 
(2012), who uses the same Finnish election thresholds as we do. However, he finds that 
government spending decreases after crossing the threshold. This behavioral effect on public 
spending could potentially be another confounding response to council size policy, but if 
anything this effect should make the elections less important because of smaller stakes, thus 
reducing the turnout rather than increasing it (e.g., Andersen et al. 2014). Moreover, using 
data from later years than him and different RDD specifications, we do not find any effect of 
council size on public spending (see Table B3, discussed later), and thus, we do not include 
public spending in our IV model.    
Another factor that could make observing an effect at the threshold more difficult is that a 
larger council may decrease turnout because power per councilor may be lower, thus the 
benefit of getting one’s own candidate elected may be lower. The identification and 
interpretation of the treatment effect would be further complicated if additional endogenous 
choices on other institutions were taken simultaneously, such as voting in multiple elections 
or ballots at the same time (see Ade and Freier 2011 and Eggers et al. 2015b). In our data, a 
vote is given only for the municipal council election and no other decisions are made 
simultaneously.  
5. Data and descriptive analysis 
We have received the main data from Statistics Finland. The election data are publicly 
available from their website, but some control variables required access to proprietary 
databases. We limit the sample used in the analysis to five election years and to 
municipalities with a population below 45,000. This leaves us with 1,747 municipality-
election year (i.e., election) observations. Besides the endogenous variables of interest 
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described in Table 2, the other key variables for our analysis are council size, population and 
turnout. Table 5 reports summary statistics for these variables and other municipal 
characteristics that we will use for validity tests.  
Table 3. Summary statistics for outcome and control variables (population < 45,000). 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Turnout 1747 0.646 0.060 0.420 0.895 
Population 1747 7506 7592 234 44804 
Council size 1747 27 9 13 51 
Political competition 1743 0.00033 0.00058 0 0.00831 
Number of parties 1747 5.8 1.7 1 13 
Tax revenue €1000/capita 1747 2.3 0.5 1.4 6.2 
Municipality personnel/1000 people 1746 59 16 4 134 
Unemployment rate % 1736 13.2 5.2 2.2 33.9 
Grants €1000/capita 1747 1.5 0.8 -0.1 5.1 
Share of 65+ year old 1747 0.196 0.049 0.049 0.386 
Expenditure €1000/capita 1747 5.5 1.1 3.1 12.0 
  
 Graph 1 shows council size and turnout in population groups. The labels on the horizontal 
axis are the lower bounds of the group (note that the scale increases along the axis). Turnout 
clearly decreases with population but there appears to be an upward shift at the cut-off points 
where council size increases, suggesting that turnout is positively affected by the council size.  
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Graph 1. Council size and average voter turnout by population group. 
 
6. Estimation results 
6.1. The effect of council size on turnout 
Table 4 reports the individual coefficients of the group dummies of Model 1 (individual 
treatment effects), as well as the weighted average treatment effect. Columns 1 – 7 use 1st – 
7th order polynomials of population. The group dummies indicate that turnout increases with 
council size at every threshold for most specifications, but the individual effects are typically 
not significant. However, the average effect of a one-step increase in council size is positive 
across the board and statistically significant and quite robust in the specifications with a third 
or higher order polynomial of population.  
The estimates e.g. in the 6th column implies that crossing a council size threshold increases 
turnout by 1.5 percentage points on average. It is not very easy to evaluate whether this effect 
is small or large. It seems to be relatively small compared to the cross sectional variation 
across elections of similar size (see Graph 2). On the other hand, relatively large changes in 
population size would be required to achieve 1.5 percentage point change in turnout. For 
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example, based on the model fit of the 6th order polynomial model in Table 4, in our data, a 
municipality with population size 7528 has a predicted turnout of 63 % and a municipality 
with 5535 inhabitants has a fit of 64.5%. Thus, the population needs to decrease by about 
2000 (27% decrease in population) to achieve 1.5 percentage points increase in turnout.  
Table 4. Council size and voter turnout in municipal elections (Model 1 results). 
Dep var: Turnout in municipal elections         
  Order of polynomial of pop         
Threshold 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
pop>2k -0.025*** -0.016** -0.01 0.001 0.008 0.013 0.015 
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.012]   
pop>4k -0.002 0.011 0.019** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.023**  
[0.006] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]   
pop>8k 0.001 0.018* 0.022** 0.016 0.009 0.005 0.005 
[0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012]   
pop>15k 0.025** 0.036*** 0.025* 0.007 0.010 0.023 0.023 
[0.012] [0.014] [0.014] [0.016] [0.016] [0.018] [0.018]   
pop>30k 0.048*** 0.005 0.001 0.033* 0.013 0.003 0.018 
[0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.018] [0.015] [0.017] [0.019]   
Average effect 0.001  0.01* 0.013** 0.016*** 0.015** 0.015** 0.016*** 
  [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Notes: Sample size is 1,747. Standard errors are in brackets (clustered at municipality level). Significance is denoted by 
asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
In Graph 2, we illustrate these findings in two ways. In left hand graph we report a scatter 
plot of all the raw data and in the right hand graph we report bin averages. The population bin 
width varies somewhat based on the density of the data being 500 between 0 and 10000 
population, 1000 between 10000 and 20000 and 2000 above that. The right hand graph also 
shows the fit of the equation (3) regression using on the 6th order polynomial of population. 
The band around the regression line shows the 95% confidence interval. The regression line 
jumps up at all the five cut-offs, indicating that council size increases turnout. The individual 
jumps are not statistically significant with the exception of the second jump, but the 
regression results in Table 4 show that the weighted average effect is significant and stable 
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across the richer specifications. Furthermore, as correlation type evidence, we observe that 
turnout decreases with population, as we would expect if voters are rationally responding to 
pivotal probabilities. 
Graph 2. Population and voter turnout (Model 1, 6th order polynomial of population). 
 
The drawback of our main specification (Model 1) is that it uses data far from the cut-offs to 
estimate the function f at the cut-offs. The concern is that omitted election-level variables 
may confound the results if f does not adequately control for them. To analyze this issue, we 
look at the robustness of the results to adding control variables and adding flexibility to f. In 
Table B1 (Online appendix B), we repeat the analysis in Table 6 but add a set of municipality 
controls. The results do not change. 
Table 5 shows the results of Model 2, where we allow for different polynomials between 
different cut-offs. The improvement in flexibility comes at the price of reduced efficiency and 
higher than 2nd order polynomials give estimates that are too imprecise to be informative, but 
the point estimate is robust. We report the estimated effect at each threshold and the average 
treatment effect estimates for specifications using 1st - 3rd order polynomials of population 
interacted with the group dummies. 
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The average treatment effect estimate is 1.4 percentage points and significant at the 5% level 
in the first column of Table 5 with the piecewise linear specification. Including the 2nd order 
term (column 2) reduces the estimate to 1.1 percentage points and it is now only weakly 
(10% level) significant. In the third column, the average effect increases but becomes 
insignificant. In the last three columns, we control for municipality attributes. The weighted 
estimated average effects are almost the same as without additional controls.  
Table 5. Council size and voter turnout in municipal elections (Model 2 results). 
Dep var: Turnout in municipal elections       
  Order of polynomial of pop   
Threshold 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd 
pop>2k 0.013 -0.002 0.013 0.015 0 0.014 
[0.011] [0.012] [0.014]   [0.011] [0.012] [0.013]    
pop>4k 0.015* 0.019* 0.025** 0.013 0.018* 0.022*   
[0.009] [0.010] [0.012]   [0.008] [0.010] [0.012]    
pop>8k 0.012 0.012 0.019 0.011 0.01 0.018 
[0.012] [0.014] [0.016]   [0.010] [0.012] [0.014]    
pop>15k 0.018 0.014 -0.01 0.011 0.009 -0.012 
[0.016] [0.022] [0.026]   [0.015] [0.021] [0.025]    
pop>30k 0.014 0.017 -0.017 0.019 0.013 -0.017 
[0.012] [0.018] [0.020]   [0.014] [0.019] [0.022]    
Average effect 0.014** 0.011* 0.013  0.013** 0.010* 0.011  
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] 
Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES 
N 1747 1747 1747 1736 1736 1736 
Notes: Sample size is 1,747. Standard errors are in brackets (clustered at municipality level). Significance is denoted by 
asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
In Table 6, we report the results from a nonparametric local linear estimation. We use 
triangular kernel. We report the results using the optimal bandwidth by Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman (2012) and also study the sensitivity of the results to half and double the 
optimal ones. We report the effect estimated at each threshold separately and also the 
weighted average effect. Standard errors for the average are not shown because the average is 
a combination of estimates from separate regressions. The results both at the individual 
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thresholds and the average are very close to those obtained with the parametric specifications. 
Overall, we are comfortable in proceeding with the Model 1 in the IV. 
Table 6. Nonparametric local linear RDD. 
  Bandwidth   
Threshold IK*0.5 IK IK*2 
pop>2k -0.014 0.003 0.008 
[0.012] [0.011] [0.011] 
Bandwidth 425 850 1700 
N 218 411 507 
pop>4k 0.034*** 0.027*** 0.023*** 
[0.012] [0.009] [0.009] 
Bandwidth 514 1028 2056 
N 178 382 527 
pop>8k 0.005 0.011 0.012 
[0.011] [0.012] [0.012] 
Bandwidth 857 1713 3426 
N 160 286 402 
pop>15k 0.008 0.004 0.008 
[0.019] [0.021] [0.021] 
Bandwidth 1952 3903 7806 
N 77 143 199 
pop>30k -0.01 -0.001 0.005 
[0.022] [0.015] [0.014] 
Bandwidth 3446 6891 13782 
N 40 79 101 
Average 0.006 0.012 0.013 
  [N.A.] [N.A.] [N.A.] 
Notes:Table shows nonparametric local linear estimation results for each threshold separately and the weighted average 
effect. Triangular kernel is used. IK refers to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal bandwidth. Standard errors are in 
brackets (clustered at the municipality level). Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
6.2. Validity checks 
We test the validity of the RDD through two placebo tests. First, we use data on turnout in 
national parliamentary elections to see if the overall propensity to vote is correlated with the 
treatment variables. These general elections take place one year prior to local elections and 
there pivotal probabilities are not affected by size of the municipality. Sample size is 
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somewhat smaller than in the municipal election data because data on national elections in 
1995 is not available to us. Graph B1 (Online appendix B) shows the fitted regression line of 
specification 6 in Table 4 with the general election turnout as the dependent variable. There 
are both upward and downward notches in the regression line at the cut-offs without a 
systematic pattern. Table B2 (Online appendix B) confirms that the average effect is close to 
zero and insignificant in all specifications (1st to 7th order polynomials). This suggests that the 
positive effect on turnout in local elections is indeed caused by the council size change and is 
not driven by other factors. Interestingly, the turnout in municipal elections is decreasing in 
population but in national elections there is no relationship between population and turnout. 
This is consistent with rational voting, since in national elections the pivotal probability is not 
influenced by municipal population whereas in municipal elections, local population has a 
large influence on the pivotal probability. 
In our second placebo test, we estimate Model 1 with artificial cut-offs created by shifting the 
real cut-offs between -40% and 40%. We use the 6th order polynomial of population. Graph 
B2 (Online appendix B) shows the results. The pattern is as it should be. Analysis with 
placebo thresholds results consistently in zero effect, unless the artificial location is very 
close the real one. When the location is shifted only between -1 % and +8 % the result is 
positive and statistically significant. These results reflect the somewhat inflexible 
specification rather than any threat to validity.  
Manipulation and precise control over population measures would invalidate the research 
design. In our setup, the manipulation of population statistics would be very costly to 
municipalities, because this information is gathered independently by central government 
from the official population register. Furthermore, as is standard in the literature, we conduct 
a McCrary (2008) density test of manipulation separately for each threshold. The idea is to 
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show that there are no discontinuities in the amount of observations at the thresholds, as there 
should be in the case of local randomization. We present these tests in Graph B3 (Online 
appendix B). We do not find evidence of manipulation at any of the five analyzed thresholds. 
Furthermore, the statistically insignificant jumps may go up or down depending on the 
threshold, implying that even a joint test would not (and does not) provide statistically 
significant evidence of a jump in any direction. 
Finally, we test for the possibility that the results might be driven by confounding factors not 
adequately captured by the polynomial of the population by using background characteristics 
of municipalities as the dependent variable in Model 1. Table B3 (Online appendix B)  
reports these balancing tests for six municipality characteristics that are likely to correlate 
with turnout: number municipal employees per capita, unemployment rate, tax revenue per 
capita, share of over 65 year olds, central government grants per capita and municipal 
expenditure per capita. Three out of 30 estimates for individual threshold treatment effects 
are significant at the 5% level, but the average effect is insignificant for all of these 
covariates, supporting the validity of the RDD. Moreover, Table B3 reports two measures of 
political competition: the number of parties and the minimum within party margin of victory 
in the municipality. Neither of these measures jumps at the thresholds. This implies that we 
do not need to address political competition, i.e. closeness of elections, as an endogenous 
variable in the next section.   
6.3. Instrumental variables regression 
The purpose of the IV regression is to compare which channel, voters responding to pivotal 
probabilities, number of candidates or their quality, or proportionality explains the effect of 
council size on turnout. In Table 7, we report the results from the three first stages of our IV 
regression using municipal level analysis. We limit the analysis to 3rd to 6th order 
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polynomials.13 All the four variables seem to be relevant based on the significance of the 
average effects. Moreover, the individual thresholds seem to affect different outcomes 
somewhat differently, implying that the second stage regression may identify which of these 
mechanisms is behind the overall effect. Note also that the overall effect is strongest at the 
second threshold which is also significant for all the endogenous variables (at least in most 
specifications) implying that more than one mechanism may be behind the overall findings. 
The F tests tell that the first stage for proportionality is the strongest, for the pivotal 
probability the second strongest, but for the two candidate variables quite weak.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
13 We do not use the 1st - 2nd order, because the overall effect of council size on turnout was not present then. 
We do not use 7th or higher order, because the first stage F tests show that the first stages of all the endogenous 
variables become less powerful as the order of polynomial increase (see Online Appendix C). We also report the 
first stages graphically in the Appendix C. 
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Table 7. IV estimation, first stages, municipal level (Model 1). 
  Dep var: Candidates Dep var: Simulated pivotal probability 
  Order of polynomial of pop Order of polynomial of pop 
Threshold 3rd 4th 5th 6th 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
pop>2k 5.68*** 2.47 3.8 1.31 -0.0086*** -0.0018 -0.0002 0.0007 
  [1.99] [2.12] [2.34] [2.06] [0.0030] [0.0034] [0.0041] [0.0049] 
pop>4k 7.03*** 4.72** 5.01** 6.30** 0.003 0.0079** 0.0077** 0.0068** 
  [2.60] [2.39] [2.31] [2.46] [0.0023] [0.0031] [0.0034] [0.0027] 
pop>8k 3.83 5.68 4.37 6.61* 0.0179*** 0.0142*** 0.0107*** 0.0095*** 
  [3.34] [3.72] [4.14] [3.90] [0.0026] [0.0020] [0.0018] [0.0024] 
pop>15k 8.03 13.38* 13.92* 8.07 0.0084*** -0.001 0.0002 0.0039 
  [7.00] [7.75] [7.87] [8.21] [0.0022] [0.0031] [0.0027] [0.0027] 
pop>30k 31.49*** 22.11** 18.17 22.70** -0.0062** 0.0126*** 0.0002 -0.0008 
  [10.07] [9.93] [11.43] [10.77] [0.0029] [0.0042] [0.0027] [0.0038] 
Avg. effect 7.80*** 6.96*** 6.83*** 6.63*** 0.0042*** 0.0062*** 0.0050*** 0.0051*** 
  [2.15] [2.02] [2.05] [2.04] [0.0015] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] 
1st stage F 3.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 21.5 15.0 8.7 7.4 
  Dep var: Share of incumbents Dep var: Proportionality 
  Order of polynomial of pop Order of polynomial of pop 
Threshold 3rd 4th 5th 6th 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
pop>2k -0.013 0.005 0.016 0.033** -0.00546*** -0.00400*** -0.00299*** -0.00187* 
  [0.009] [0.011] [0.013] [0.014] [0.00048] [0.00059] [0.00079] [0.00101] 
pop>4k 0.019** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.026** -0.00222*** -0.00117 -0.00095 -0.00153** 
  [0.010] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.00059] [0.00081] [0.00083] [0.00061] 
pop>8k 0.055*** 0.044*** 0.033*** 0.019* -0.0003 -0.00114*** -0.00214*** -0.00314*** 
  [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.00057] [0.00038] [0.00034] [0.00052] 
pop>15k 0.015 -0.015 -0.01 0.028** -0.00059* -0.00302*** -0.00261*** 0.00001 
  [0.010] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.00035] [0.00072] [0.00060] [0.00055] 
pop>30k -0.018 0.034** 0.001 -0.029** -0.00184** 0.00242** -0.00058 -0.00261*** 
  [0.011] [0.014] [0.010] [0.013] [0.00071] [0.00113] [0.00079] [0.00096] 
Avg. effect 0.0173*** 0.0219*** 0.0208*** 0.0222*** -0.0022*** -0.0018*** -0.0019*** -0.0019*** 
  [0.0061] [0.0067] [0.0064] [0.0062] 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 
1st stage F 7.9 6.6 3.9 3.3 47.2 34.4 20.8 20.6 
Notes: Sample size is 1,746. 1st stage F is the F test of the excluded instruments. Standard errors are in brackets (clustered at 
municipality level). Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
We report the municipality level second stage results in Table 8. The municipal level analysis 
is not able to identify separately which mechanism explains the increase in turnout. This is 
reflected both in the insignificant parameter estimates and in the underidentification test. The 
endogenous variables are too collinear and the instruments too weak to tell apart the 
mechanisms. 
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Table 8. The effects of pivotal probability, proportionality, number of candidates and share of 
incumbent candidates on turnout in municipal elections, IV estimates, second stage, municipal level. 
Dep var: Turnout in municipal elections     
Order of polynomial of pop 
Threshold 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
Candidates 0.00076 0.002 0.00211 0.00158 
[0.00049] [0.00178] [0.00134] [0.00099] 
Share of incumbents 0.29313 1.42519 1.04383 0.67563 
[0.91511] [2.28697] [1.26416] [0.46865] 
Proportionality 1.0208 3.54528 5.8762 7.00966 
[3.32080] [5.99473] [6.17933] [5.71161] 
Pivotal probability 0.33077 -3.8488 -1.94513 0.63439 
  [2.78577] [7.39341] [4.07795] [1.97258] 
N 1746 1746 1746 1746 
Kleibergen-Paap 
underidentification test 0.998 0.349 0.719 2.47 
 p-value 0.607 0.84 0.698 0.29 
Notes: Sample size is 1,746. Standard errors are in brackets (clustered at municipality level). Significance is denoted by 
asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
In Table 9, we report the first stage results at the municipality-party level rather than the 
municipality level. This increases the number of observations from 1746 to 10171. For each 
party we can calculate the party level turnout (the share of eligible voters voting for a 
particular party), the number of candidates, the share of incumbent candidates and the pivotal 
probabilities both within the party and between the respective party and other parties, as well 
as the party proportionality as the seat share of the last candidate in the party. We also ask 
whether the political competition variable (the margin of victory within party) jumps at the 
threshold in the party-level data even though it did not in the municipal level analysis.  
Both the between and within party pivotality jump at the thresholds and in roughly similar 
pattern. All the other four variables seem to be also relevant based on the significance of the 
average effects. Moreover, the individual thresholds seem to affect different outcomes 
somewhat differently, implying that the second stage regression may identify which of these 
mechanisms is behind the overall effect. We report the first stages graphically in Appendix C. 
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Table 9. IV estimation , first stages, municipality-party level (Model 1) 
 
Notes: Unit of observation is party-election (N=8384 for proportionality and political competition, and 10,171 for the 
others). 1st stage F is the F test of the excluded instruments. Standard errors are in brackets (clustered at municipality level). 
Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Threshold 3rd 4th 5th 6th 3rd 4th 5th 6th
pop>2k -0.005*** -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.004*** -0.002*** 0.000 0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
pop>4k 0.000 0.003** 0.003* 0.003* 0.001* 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
pop>8k 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001** -0.001*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
pop>15k 0.003*** -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 0.001*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
pop>30k -0.002* 0.004** 0 -0.001 -0.002** 0.004*** 0.000 -0.003**
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Avg. effect 0.0012 0.0024*** 0.0020** 0.0021** 0.0002 0.001** 0.0011** 0.0014**
[0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0006]
1st stage F 16.6 9.8 5.3 3.2 16.5 11.9 8.2 4.7
Threshold 3rd 4th 5th 6th 3rd 4th 5th 6th
pop>2k 0.17 0.32 0.93* 0.92* -0.0073*** -0.0061*** -0.0054*** -0.0045***
[0.40] [0.44] [0.51] [0.55] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0008] [0.0009]
pop>4k 1.10** 1.22** 1.48*** 1.48*** -0.0041*** -0.0031*** -0.0028*** -0.0030***
[0.54] [0.54] [0.53] [0.53] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006]
pop>8k 0.56 0.51 0.06 0.06 -0.0017*** -0.0021*** -0.0027*** -0.0033***
[0.58] [0.61] [0.67] [0.67] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004]
pop>15k 0.67 0.44 0.42 0.41 -0.0017*** -0.0035*** -0.0035*** -0.0022***
[1.12] [1.26] [1.25] [1.33] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0004]
pop>30k 3.85*** 4.20*** 3.13** 3.14** -0.0027*** 0.0002 -0.0013** -0.0025***
[1.23] [1.32] [1.31] [1.33] [0.0005] [0.0007] [0.0005] [0.0006]
Avg. effect 0.88** 0.93** 0.96*** 0.96*** -0.0038*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** -0.0033***
[0.39] [0.37] [0.37] [0.37] 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
1st stage F 3.0 3.3 2.8 2.8 55 38 34 32
Threshold 3rd 4th 5th 6th 3rd 4th 5th 6th
pop>2k -0.015 0.001 0.012 0.024* -0.00085*** -0.00081*** -0.00084*** -0.00086**
[0.009] [0.010] [0.012] [0.013] [0.00026] [0.00028] [0.00031] [0.00034]
pop>4k 0.003 0.016 0.021** 0.019* -0.00074*** -0.00071*** -0.00072*** -0.00072***
[0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.00019] [0.00023] [0.00024] [0.00024]
pop>8k 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.035*** 0.026** -0.00038** -0.00039** -0.00037** -0.00036*
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.00018] [0.00017] [0.00017] [0.00020]
pop>15k 0.015 -0.009 -0.01 0.01 -0.00059*** -0.00064*** -0.00064*** -0.00067***
[0.011] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.00017] [0.00020] [0.00020] [0.00020]
pop>30k -0.004 0.033* 0.013 -0.005 -0.00041** -0.00033 -0.00028 -0.00026
[0.014] [0.017] [0.015] [0.016] [0.00019] [0.00025] [0.00021] [0.00026]
Avg. effect 0.0116* 0.0168*** 0.0173*** 0.0189*** -0.00063*** -0.00062*** -0.00062*** -0.00062***
[0.0061] [0.0062] [0.0061] [0.0061] 0.00012 0.00013 0.00014 0.00014
1st stage F 8.9 6.8 3.7 2.3 8.6 6.4 6.2 5.7
Order of polynomial of pop Order of polynomial of pop
Dep var: Share of incumbents Dep var: Political competition
Order of polynomial of pop Order of polynomial of pop
Dep var: Between parties Dep var: Within party pivotal probability
Order of polynomial of pop Order of polynomial of pop
Dep var: Number of candidates Dep var: Proportionality
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We begin the municipality-party level second stage analysis by asking how turnout responds 
to the between and within party pivotality in Table 10. The result is striking: Turnout 
responds only to the within party pivotal probabilities but not at all to the between party ones. 
The within party effect is large, robust and highly significant. The between party effect is 
negative but not significant. A likely explanation to this is that the within party dimension is 
much more salient. Within parties the election system is simply N past the post, where N 
refers to the number seats for the given party. The pivotal calculus is much simpler within 
party than between party, because it depends only on the votes given to members of that 
single party, and thus, voters can easily observe how many votes decided the elections at the 
margin of getting elected last time. On the contrary, between party pivotal calculus requires 
information on the votes to all the parties and understanding of the fairly complex election 
mathematics. According to the underidentification test in Table 10, the effects are separately 
identified despite the variables being correlated.  
Table 10. The effects of between and within party pivotal probability on turnout, IV estimates, second 
stage, party level. 
Dep var: Party turnout in municipal elections     
Order of polynomial of pop 
Threshold 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
Between party pivotality -0.773 -0.971 -1.282 -1.282 
[0.897] [0.833] [0.898] [0.898] 
Within party pivotality 7.638*** 8.045*** 8.169*** 8.169*** 
  [1.680] [1.504] [1.493] [1.493] 
N 10171 10171 10171 10171 
Kleibergen-Paap 
underidentification test 8.84 11.8 12.1 12.9 
 p-value 0.065 0.019 0.016 0.012 
Notes: Unit of observation is party-election (N=10,171). Only municipalities with a population below 45,000 are included. 
Standard errors are in brackets (clustered at municipality level). Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
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Alternative explanation to the results in Table 10 is that within party pivotality is correlated 
with some other mechanism that is really behind the turnout response, whereas between party 
pivotality is not. We turn to this in Table 11 where the within party pivotality is analyzed 
jointly with the other endogenous variables. We find evidence that the most plausible channel 
of crossing the threshold on turnout is the pivotal probability, because it has a large, positive 
and significant effect in three out of four specifications and the other endogenous variables 
are not significant in any specification. Moreover, the underidentification tests suggest that 
for the 3rd order polynomial specification we are likely to be able to identify all the five 
effects separately. In Table C11 in the Appendix C, we also show that the result for pivotality 
are robust to including only one of the other endogenous variable at the time as well 
including these variables as squared to assure that nonlinearities in the effects of the other 
endogenous variables are not important.  
 Table 11. The effects of pivotal probability, number of candidates and share of incumbent candidates 
on turnout in municipal elections, IV estimates, second stage, party level. 
Dep var: Party turnout in municipal elections 
Order of polynomial of pop 
Threshold 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
Candidates 0.000 0.004 0.003 -0.002 
[0.001] [0.005] [0.005] [0.014] 
Share of incumbents -0.122 -0.189 -0.357 -1.025 
[0.152] [0.202] [0.711] [3.515] 
Proportionality -0.106 -5.252 -8.217 -7.85 
[2.762] [9.620] [23.199] [33.170] 
Political competition 2.506 32.713 44.582 11.071 
[15.312] [55.905] [115.388] [63.428] 
Within party pivotality 6.017*** 6.578*** 7.098** 4.725 
  [1.592] [2.166] [3.458] [7.142] 
N 8384 8384 8384 8384 
Kleibergen-Paap 
underidentification test 4.42 0.737 0.274 0.128 
 p-value 0.035 0.39 0.60 0.72 
Notes: Unit of observation is party-election (N=8384). Party list with none elected are excluded. Only municipalities with 
population below 45,000 are included. Standard errors are in brackets (clustered at the municipality level). Significance is 
denoted by asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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It is hard to come up with possible omitted alternative mechanism than the ones already 
included in Table 11. For example any behavioral responses by the parties or the candidates, 
for example increased campaigning effort in the municipalities just above the threshold, 
should be captured by the included variables. Parties and candidates should respond to the 
political competition variable rather than the pivotality variable, because they can influence 
more than one voter simultaneously. Moreover, both this results and the fact that turnout only 
responds to the within party dimension largely rules out a role of elite mobilization. 
7. Conclusions 
We present quasi-experimental evidence that is consistent with the rational voting hypothesis. 
We use RDD to show that turnout increases when the number of available council seats in 
elections increases exogenously. We also use election simulations to show that the change in 
seats increases the probability of one single vote having an impact on the election outcome. 
This change is sharp and relatively large at the discontinuity. We also use a novel 
instrumental variables design utilizing the presence of multiple thresholds to show that the 
effect on turnout can be attributed to the increase in pivotal probability rather than to the 
simultaneous increase in the number of candidates, the candidates’ quality, proportionality or 
political completion more generally. The voters seem to conduct calculus of voting and take 
this into account when making decisions on whether to vote or to abstain.  
Our results do not imply that the expressive utility components do not matter. Moreover, our 
results cannot rule out some of the alternative explanations for pure rational voting such as 
group voting where larger groups consider their pivotality together. We can only state that the 
calculus of voting seems to also matter. It may also be the case that only some voters but not 
all conduct the calculus of voting. Moreover, we do not learn much concerning how exact or 
heuristic this calculus is, for example it may well be that voters learn about pivotal 
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probabilities from the results of the past elections rather than actually calculating them. We 
can only say that whatever type of calculus is conducted, it is empirically consistent with the 
rational voting model in Finnish municipal elections.  
The Finnish proportional open-list election system has features of both majority and closed-
list elections, since the within party competition component is simply N-past–the-post and the 
between parties competition component is the same as in the closed-list proportional system. 
Therefore, the results can potentially apply to a wide range of other institutions and countries. 
Of particular interest here is that voters seem only to respond to the more salient within party 
pivotal probabilities but not to the between party ones. This result has implications on the 
generalizability of the results. One should expect to see rational voting under simple election 
rules such as first-past-the-post or majority elections, but less likely in more complex systems 
such as closed-list proportional elections.     
Finally, the only interest of this study is not what mechanism voters respond to but also what 
mechanisms they do not respond to. It is interesting to observe that the possible increase in 
political efficacy due to proportionality effects are not likely to be behind the turnout results, 
nor are elite mobilization or other party or candidate responses. 
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Supporting information (Online) 
ONLINE APPENDIX A: How pivotal probability changes at the thresholds based on simulations 
We conduct two counterfactual experiments in the pivotal probability simulation to assess the 
effect of crossing the population threshold on the pivotal probabilities. In the first 
counterfactual, we assume that in each municipality, fewer seats than in the real elections 
were actually given while maintaining everything else the same. The number of seats is 
assumed to be what they would be below the next population threshold downwards. 
However, we keep the total number of votes given unchanged. Only the allocated amount of 
seats is different. We call this counterfactual “CF down” in Table 2. “CF up” is otherwise the 
same but the number of seats is as above the next threshold upwards. 
In Table A1, we report a summary of our simulation results both for the simulated real 
council size elections and the simulated counterfactual elections. In the first three rows, we 
show the average between parties results for all the election-party observations and in the last 
three rows we show the average within party results for all the election-candidate 
observations. The counterfactual results work as expected, as pivotal probability is lower 
when fewer seats are allocated and higher with more seats. 
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Table A1. Descriptive statistics of the pivotal probability simulations. 
Simulation N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CF down between  10171 0.017 0.019 0 0.111 
Real between 10171 0.020 0.020 0 0.123 
CF up between 10171 0.024 0.021 0 0.231 
CF down within 146234 0.024 0.047 0 0.408 
Real within 146234 0.028 0.051 0 0.389 
CF up within 146234 0.032 0.057 0 0.494 
Notes: The unit of observation is election-party (first three rows) or election-candidate (last three rows). Only municipalities 
with a population below 45,000 are included. “between” and “within” refer to pivotalities between and within parties. “CF 
down” refers to counterfactual simulation where the council size is what it would be in the next population group below the 
real one and “CF up” refers to counterfactual simulation where the council size is what it would be in the next population 
group above the real one. 
 
In Table A2, we report the simulated causal effect of crossing the nearest population 
threshold on the pivotal probability for each threshold separately. This effect is not yet the 
actual first stage regression of the IV estimation, but rather based on the counterfactual 
simulations. This effect is calculated as the difference between the “Real” and “CF down” 
results for those municipalities just above (10% bandwidth) the threshold and as the 
difference between “CF up” and “Real” for those municipalities just below the threshold. We 
find systematically larger effects for smaller thresholds as expected.  
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Table A2. The effect of crossing the threshold on the pivotal probabilities both between and within 
parties. Simulation results within 10% population bands around each threshold.  
Threshold Band Mean Std. Dev. N 
Relative 
council size 
change 
2k between 10 % 0.0052 0.029 518 0.24 
4k between 10 % 0.0045 0.024 717 0.29 
8k between 10 % 0.0039 0.018 947 0.3 
15k between 10 % 0.0019 0.015 430 0.23 
30k between 10 % 0.0008 0.011 322 0.19 
2k within 10 % 0.0070 0.056 4799 0.24 
4k within 10 % 0.0066 0.052 8554 0.29 
8k within 10 % 0.0055 0.043 14081 0.3 
15k within 10 % 0.0030 0.031 8324 0.23 
30k within 10 % 0.0024 0.023 7376 0.19 
Notes: The unit of observation is election-party (first three rows) or election-candidate (last three rows). Only municipalities 
with a population below 45,000 are included. “Relative council size change” is the relative council size change at the given 
threshold. N is the number of observations (at party or candidate level) in the group around the threshold defined as being 
within the 10% population band of the population at the threshold. “Mean” is the average change in the pivotal probability of 
crossing the threshold defined as the average of the differences between both real and counterfactual down and 
counterfactual up and real. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX B: Robustness and validity 
Table B1. Council size and voter turnout (municipality attributes controlled for). 
Dep var: Turnout in municipal elections           
  Order of polynomial of pop         
Threshold 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
pop>2k -0.0250*** -0.0164** -0.0077 0.0028 0.0103 0.0153 0.0173 
[0.0071] [0.0075] [0.0081] [0.0093] [0.0101] [0.0110] [0.0113]   
pop>4k -0.0061 0.0072 0.0176** 0.0249*** 0.0263*** 0.0237*** 0.0203** 
[0.0056] [0.0071] [0.0080] [0.0086] [0.0086] [0.0083] [0.0087]   
pop>8k -0.0006 0.0160* 0.0218** 0.0155 0.008 0.0035 0.0036 
[0.0075] [0.0091] [0.0095] [0.0095] [0.0100] [0.0107] [0.0106]   
pop>15k 0.0234* 0.0329** 0.0179 0.0008 0.0046 0.0163 0.0167 
[0.0121] [0.0132] [0.0138] [0.0158] [0.0153] [0.0169] [0.0172]   
pop>30k 0.0487*** 0.0054 0.0046 0.0331* 0.0094 0.0014 0.0177 
  [0.0140] [0.0152] [0.0148] [0.0189] [0.0159] [0.0179] [0.0196]   
Average effect -0.001  0.008  0.012** 0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 0.015** 
  [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
N 1736 1736 1736 1736 1736 1736 1736 
Notes: Sample size is 1,736. Controls: tax revenue/capita, municipality employees/capita, unemployment rate, central 
government grants/capita, share of over 65 year olds, municipal expenditure/capita. Standard errors are in brackets (clustered 
at municipality level). Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table B2. Placebo tests with national elections data. 
Dep var: Turnout in national elections           
  Order of polynomial of pop         
Threshold 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
pop>2k -0.0051 -0.0048 -0.0038 -0.0037 -0.0041 -0.0066 -0.0086 
[0.0063] [0.0065] [0.0071] [0.0081] [0.0090] [0.0099] [0.0104] 
pop>4k 0.0011 0.0015 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0042 0.0079 
[0.0058] [0.0074] [0.0090] [0.0100] [0.0101] [0.0101] [0.0104] 
pop>8k 0.0112 0.0117 0.0125 0.0125 0.0129 0.0151 0.0149 
[0.0071] [0.0090] [0.0096] [0.0099] [0.0106] [0.0111] [0.0111] 
pop>15k 0.0013 0.0017 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0063 -0.006 
[0.0103] [0.0115] [0.0114] [0.0137] [0.0132] [0.0153] [0.0153] 
pop>30k 0.0324** 0.0310*** 0.0295** 0.0297* 0.0311** 0.0360** 0.0166 
[0.0138] [0.0118] [0.0134] [0.0165] [0.0134] [0.0167] [0.0168] 
Average effect 0.004  0.005  0.005  0.005  0.005  0.005  0.004  
  [0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
N 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076 
Notes: Sample size is 1,076. Standard errors are in brackets (clustered at municipality level). Significance is denoted by 
asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Graph B1. Placebo test with national elections turnout (Model 1, 6th order polynomial).  
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Graph B2. Placebo tests with artificial cut-offs (Model 1, 6th order polynomial of pop). 
 
 
Table B3. Balancing tests (Model 1, 6th order polynomial of pop). 
Threshold 
Munic. 
Employees 
Tax 
revenue 
Share of 
over 
65yo Grants Expenditures
Unemp. 
share 
Number of 
parties 
Political 
competition
pop>2k 111 -0.061 0.010 0.194 0.266 0.164 -0.0001 -0.0937 
[167] [0.077] [0.009] [0.162] [0.268] [0.909]   [0.0001] [0.2224]   
pop>4k 111 0.074 -0.006 -0.053 0.091 0.051 0.0000 -0.1454 
[126] [0.068] [0.009] [0.138] [0.183] [0.944]   [0.0001] [0.1941]   
pop>8k 35 -0.021 -0.010 0.045 -0.007 -0.403 -0.0002*** 0.3644 
[134] [0.141] [0.009] [0.149] [0.218] [1.060]   [0.0001] [0.2298]   
pop>15k 59 0.323** 0.013 -0.059 0.006 -2.029 0.0000 0.288 
[168] [0.156] [0.012] [0.192] [0.276] [1.336]   [0.0001] [0.3089]   
pop>30k -59 -0.331 -0.036** -0.206 -0.660** -0.53 -0.0002 -0.4268 
  [180] [0.286] [0.018] [0.183] [0.326] [2.355]   [0.0001] [0.5287]   
Avg. effect 72.6 0.0282 -0.00221 0.0179 0.0436 -0.386 -0.000065 0.0393 
  79.2 0.0594 0.00495 0.0852 0.125 0.571 0.000040 0.1262 
N 1736 1736 1736 1736 1736 1736 1733 1736 
Notes: All models use the parametric RDD with 6th order polynomial. Standard errors are in brackets (clustered at 
municipality level). Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Graph B3. McCrary (2008) tests of manipulation of the forcing variable for each threshold.  
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ONLINE APPENDIX C: First stages of IV regression, municipality and municipality-party levels 
(Model 1). 
Table C1. IV estimation, first stage for simulated pivotal probability, municipality level (Model 1). 
Dep var: Simulated pivotal probability           
  Order of polynomial of pop     
Threshold 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
pop>2k -0.0223*** -0.0159*** -0.0086*** -0.0018 -0.0002 0.0007 0.0035 
[0.0033] [0.0032] [0.0030] [0.0034] [0.0041] [0.0049] [0.0056]   
pop>4k -0.0163*** -0.0052*** 0.003 0.0079** 0.0077** 0.0068** 0.0067*** 
[0.0017] [0.0020] [0.0023] [0.0031] [0.0034] [0.0027] [0.0022]   
pop>8k -0.0006 0.0128*** 0.0179*** 0.0142*** 0.0107*** 0.0095*** 0.0089*** 
[0.0018] [0.0024] [0.0026] [0.0020] [0.0018] [0.0024] [0.0025]   
pop>15k 0.0124*** 0.0202*** 0.0084*** -0.001 0.0002 0.0039 0.0048 
[0.0028] [0.0030] [0.0022] [0.0031] [0.0027] [0.0027] [0.0030]   
pop>30k 0.0321*** -0.0015 -0.0062** 0.0126*** 0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0013 
[0.0050] [0.0055] [0.0029] [0.0042] [0.0027] [0.0038] [0.0030]   
Avg. effect -0.0061*** 0.0008  0.0042*** 0.0062*** 0.0050*** 0.0051*** 0.0056*** 
  [0.0015] [0.0014] [0.0015] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0019] 
1st stage F 106.0 39.8 21.5 15.0 8.7 7.4 6.3 
Notes: Sample size is 1,746. 1st stage F is the F test of the excluded instruments. Standard errors are in brackets (clustered at 
municipality level). Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Graph C1. Population and pivotality, municipality level (Model 1, 6th order polynomial of 
population). 
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Table C2. IV estimation, first stage for the number of candidates, municipality level (Model 1). 
Dep var: Candidates 
Order of polynomial of pop     
Threshold 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
pop>2k 11.08*** 6.77*** 5.68*** 2.47 3.8 1.31 -0.31 
[1.48] [1.77] [1.99] [2.12] [2.34] [2.06] [1.85]    
pop>4k 15.13*** 8.37*** 7.03*** 4.72** 5.01** 6.30** 8.87*** 
[1.98] [2.54] [2.60] [2.39] [2.31] [2.46] [2.68]    
pop>8k 13.08*** 4.63 3.83 5.68 4.37 6.61* 6.54*   
[3.23] [3.57] [3.34] [3.72] [4.14] [3.90] [3.86]    
pop>15k 11.47* 6.22 8.03 13.38* 13.92* 8.07 7.58 
[6.62] [6.03] [7.00] [7.75] [7.87] [8.21] [8.16]    
pop>30k 9.69 30.74*** 31.49*** 22.11** 18.17 22.70** 10.14 
[8.40] [10.35] [10.07] [9.93] [11.43] [10.77] [11.64]   
Avg. effect 12.74*** 8.32*** 7.80*** 6.96*** 6.83*** 6.63*** 6.04*** 
  [2.27] [2.20] [2.15] [2.02] [2.05] [2.04] [2.05] 
1st stage F 29.7 9.1 3.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.2 
 
Notes: Sample size is 1,746. 1st stage F is the F test of the excluded instruments. Standard errors are in brackets (clustered at 
municipality level). Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Graph C2. Population and the number of candidates, municipality level (Model 1, 6th order 
polynomial of population). 
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Table C3. IV estimation, first stage for the share of incumbents, municipality level (Model 1). 
Dep var: Share of incumbents 
Order of polynomial of pop     
Threshold 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
pop>2k -0.039*** -0.025*** -0.013 0.005 0.016 0.033** 0.040*** 
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014]   
pop>4k -0.017*** 0.004 0.019** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.026** 0.014 
[0.006] [0.007] [0.010] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.010]   
pop>8k 0.019*** 0.045*** 0.055*** 0.044*** 0.033*** 0.019* 0.019*   
[0.007] [0.009] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]   
pop>15k 0.020* 0.036*** 0.015 -0.015 -0.01 0.028** 0.031**  
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014]   
pop>30k 0.055*** -0.009 -0.018 0.034** 0.001 -0.029** 0.031*** 
[0.012] [0.010] [0.011] [0.014] [0.010] [0.013] [0.011]   
Avg. effect -0.0024  0.0111** 0.0173*** 0.0219*** 0.0208*** 0.0222*** 0.025*** 
  [0.0043] [0.0053] [0.0061] [0.0067] [0.0064] [0.0062] [0.0061] 
1st stage F 16.4 10.3 7.9 6.6 3.9 3.3 4.3 
Notes: Sample size is 1,746. 1st stage F is the F test of the excluded instruments. Standard errors are in brackets (clustered at 
municipality level). Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Graph C3. Population and share of incumbents, municipality level (Model 1, 6th order polynomial of 
population). 
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Table C4. IV estimation, first stage for proportionality, municipality level (Model 1). 
Dep var: 
Proportionality               
Order of polynomial of pop       
Threshold 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
pop>2k -0.00693*** -0.00628*** -0.00546*** -0.00400*** -0.00299*** -0.00187* -0.00147 
[0.00059] [0.00053] [0.00048] [0.00059] [0.00079] [0.00101] [0.00108]   
pop>4k -0.00425*** -0.00322*** -0.00222*** -0.00117 -0.00095 -0.00153** -0.00217***
[0.00027] [0.00039] [0.00059] [0.00081] [0.00083] [0.00061] [0.00045]   
pop>8k -0.00218*** -0.00091** -0.0003 -0.00114*** -0.00214*** -0.00314*** -0.00312***
[0.00025] [0.00045] [0.00057] [0.00038] [0.00034] [0.00052] [0.00050]   
pop>15k -0.00002 0.00077 -0.00059* -0.00302*** -0.00261*** 0.00001 0.00013 
[0.00040] [0.00052] [0.00035] [0.00072] [0.00060] [0.00055] [0.00055]   
pop>30k 0.00191*** -0.00127* -0.00184** 0.00242** -0.00058 -0.00261*** 0.00052 
  [0.00064] [0.00065] [0.00071] [0.00113] [0.00079] [0.00096] [0.00081]   
Avg. effect -0.0033*** -0.0026*** -0.0022*** -0.0018*** -0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0017*** 
  0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 
1st stage F 244.5 111.8 47.2 34.4 20.8 20.6 18.3 
Notes: Sample size is 1,746. 1st stage F is the F test of the excluded instruments. Standard errors are in brackets (clustered at 
municipality level). Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Graph C4. Population and proportionality, municipality level (Model 1, 6th order polynomial of 
population). 
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Table C5. IV estimation , first stage for between party pivotal probability, municipality-party level 
(Model 1). 
Dep var: Simulated pivotal probability (between parties) 
Order of polynomial of pop     
Threshold 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
pop>2k -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]   
pop>4k -0.008*** -0.003*** 0.000 0.003** 0.003* 0.003* 0.003*   
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]   
pop>8k 0.001 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004**  
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]   
pop>15k 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.003*** -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]   
pop>30k 0.012*** 0.001 -0.002* 0.004** 0 -0.001 -0.001 
[0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]   
Avg. effect -0.0026*** -0.0006  0.0012  0.0024*** 0.0020** 0.0021** 0.0026** 
  [0.0009] [0.0007] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0011] 
1st stage F 37.9 28.5 16.6 9.8 5.3 3.2 3.0 
Notes: Unit of observation is party-election (N=10,171). 1st stage F is the F test of the excluded instruments. Standard errors 
are in brackets (clustered at municipality level). Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Graph C5. Population and between party pivotal probability, municipality-party level (Model 1, 6th 
order polynomial of population). 
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Table C6. IV estimation , first stage for within party pivotal probability, municipality-party level 
(Model 1). 
Dep var: Simulated pivotal probability (within parties) 
Order of polynomial of pop     
Threshold 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
pop>2k -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.002*** 0.000 0.003 0.004**  
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]   
pop>4k -0.002*** -0.001 0.001* 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]   
pop>8k 0.001 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001** -0.001* -0.002**  
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]   
pop>15k 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.001*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 0.001* 0.002**  
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]   
pop>30k 0.007*** 0.000 -0.002** 0.004*** 0.000 -0.003** 0.002**  
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]   
Avg. effect -0.0015*** -0.0007** 0.0002  0.001** 0.0011** 0.0014** 0.0019*** 
  [0.0005] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0007] 
1st stage F 21.1 34.7 16.5 11.9 8.2 4.7 4.5 
Notes: Unit of observation is party-election (N=10,171). 1st stage F is the F test of the excluded instruments. Standard errors 
are in brackets (clustered at municipality level). Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Graph C6. Population and within party pivotal probability, municipality-party level (Model 1, 6th 
order polynomial of population). 
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Table C7. IV estimation , first stage for the number of candidates, municipality-party level (Model 1). 
Dep var: Candidates 
Order of polynomial of pop     
Threshold 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
pop>2k 1.04*** 0.35 0.17 0.32 0.93* 0.92* 0.36 
[0.32] [0.36] [0.40] [0.44] [0.51] [0.55] [0.58]    
pop>4k 2.46*** 1.33*** 1.10** 1.22** 1.48*** 1.48*** 1.89*** 
[0.37] [0.48] [0.54] [0.54] [0.53] [0.53] [0.55]    
pop>8k 2.15*** 0.72 0.56 0.51 0.06 0.06 0.21 
[0.53] [0.60] [0.58] [0.61] [0.67] [0.67] [0.65]    
pop>15k 1.64 0.46 0.67 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.08 
[1.06] [1.00] [1.12] [1.26] [1.25] [1.33] [1.34]    
pop>30k 0.99 3.68*** 3.85*** 4.20*** 3.13** 3.14** 1.26 
[1.10] [1.23] [1.23] [1.32] [1.31] [1.33] [1.47]    
Avg. effect 1.82*** 0.99** 0.88** 0.93** 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.80** 
  [0.37] [0.40] [0.39] [0.37] [0.37] [0.37] [0.38] 
1st stage F 19.1 5.0 3.0 3.3 2.8 2.8 2.6 
Notes: Unit of observation is party-election (N=10,171). 1st stage F is the F test of the excluded instruments. Standard errors 
are in brackets (clustered at municipality level). Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Graph C7. Population and the number of candidates, municipality-party level (Model 1, 6th order 
polynomial of population). 
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Table C8. IV estimation, first stage for the share of incumbents, municipality-party level (Model 1). 
Dep var: Share of incumbents 
Order of polynomial of pop     
Threshold 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
pop>2k -0.025 -0.023*** -0.015 0.001 0.012 0.024* 0.034**  
[0.018] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.012] [0.013] [0.014]   
pop>4k -0.030** -0.008 0.003 0.016 0.021** 0.019* 0.012 
[0.014] [0.007] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010]   
pop>8k 0.023 0.040*** 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.035*** 0.026** 0.023**  
[0.016] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011]   
pop>15k 0.006 0.025** 0.015 -0.009 -0.01 0.01 0.015 
[0.024] [0.011] [0.011] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.016]   
pop>30k 0.033 0.004 -0.004 0.033* 0.013 -0.005 0.027 
[0.033] [0.012] [0.014] [0.017] [0.015] [0.016] [0.018]   
Avg. effect -0.0059  0.0064  0.0116* 0.0168*** 0.0173*** 0.0189*** 0.0216*** 
  [0.0101] [0.0054] [0.0061] [0.0062] [0.0061] [0.0061] [0.0064] 
1st stage F 3.2 11.3 8.9 6.8 3.7 2.3 2.9 
Notes: Unit of observation is party-election (N=10,171). 1st stage F is the F test of the excluded instruments. Standard errors 
are in brackets (clustered at municipality level). Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Graph C8. Population and the share of incumbents, municipality-party level (Model 1, 6th order 
polynomial of population). 
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Table C9. IV estimation, first stage for proportionality, municipality-party level (Model 1). 
Dep var: Proportionality 
Order of polynomial of pop       
Threshold 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
pop>2k -0.0086*** -0.0080*** -0.0073*** -0.0061*** -0.0054*** -0.0045*** -0.0042*** 
[0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0009]    
pop>4k -0.0060*** -0.0050*** -0.0041*** -0.0031*** -0.0028*** -0.0030*** -0.0033*** 
[0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006]    
pop>8k -0.0036*** -0.0024*** -0.0017*** -0.0021*** -0.0027*** -0.0033*** -0.0034*** 
[0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004]    
pop>15k -0.0017*** -0.0008* -0.0017*** -0.0035*** -0.0035*** -0.0022*** -0.0019*** 
[0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0005]    
pop>30k 0.0003 -0.0020*** -0.0027*** 0.0002 -0.0013** -0.0025*** -0.0010*   
  [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0007] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0006]    
Avg. effect -0.0049*** -0.0042*** -0.0038*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** -0.0033*** -0.0031*** 
  0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
1st stage F 284 123 55 38 34 32 27 
 Notes: Unit of observation is party-election (N=10,171). 1st stage F is the F test of the excluded instruments. Standard errors 
are in brackets (clustered at municipality level). Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Graph C9. Population and proportionality, municipality-party level (Model 1, 6th order polynomial of 
population). 
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Table C10. IV estimation, first stage for political competition, municipality-party level (Model 1). 
Dep var: Political competition 
Order of polynomial of pop       
Threshold 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
pop>2k -0.00096*** -0.00092*** -0.00085*** -0.00081*** -0.00084*** -0.00086** -0.00086** 
[0.00025] [0.00025] [0.00026] [0.00028] [0.00031] [0.00034] [0.00036]   
pop>4k -0.00090*** -0.00084*** -0.00074*** -0.00071*** -0.00072*** -0.00072*** -0.00072***
[0.00014] [0.00016] [0.00019] [0.00023] [0.00024] [0.00024] [0.00024]   
pop>8k -0.00052*** -0.00045*** -0.00038** -0.00039** -0.00037** -0.00036* -0.00036*  
[0.00011] [0.00015] [0.00018] [0.00017] [0.00017] [0.00020] [0.00020]   
pop>15k -0.00055*** -0.00050*** -0.00059*** -0.00064*** -0.00064*** -0.00067*** -0.00067***
[0.00015] [0.00019] [0.00017] [0.00020] [0.00020] [0.00020] [0.00021]   
pop>30k -0.0002 -0.00035** -0.00041** -0.00033 -0.00028 -0.00026 -0.00027 
  [0.00018] [0.00017] [0.00019] [0.00025] [0.00021] [0.00026] [0.00025]   
Avg. effect -0.00072*** -0.00068*** -0.00063*** -0.00062*** -0.00062*** -0.00062*** -0.00062***
  0.00008 0.0001 0.00012 0.00013 0.00014 0.00014 0.00014 
1st stage F 37.2 13.8 8.6 6.4 6.2 5.7 5.2 
 Notes: Unit of observation is party-election (N=10,171). 1st stage F is the F test of the excluded instruments. Standard errors 
are in brackets (clustered at municipality level). Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Graph C10. Population and political competition, municipality-party level (Model 1, 6th order 
polynomial of population). 
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Table C11. IV estimation, second stage with nonlinear confounders, municipality-party level. 
Dep var: Party turnout in municipal elections 
  Order of polynomial of pop   
  3rd 4th 5th 6th 
Candidates 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.007 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.009]    
Candidates^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    
Within party pivotality 6.606*** 6.573*** 6.118*** 6.622*** 
  [0.861] [1.036] [1.314] [2.380]    
Share of incumbents 0.048 0.173 0.247 0.336 
[0.608] [0.498] [0.566] [0.618]    
(Share of incumbents)^2 -0.213 -0.414 -0.541 -0.651 
[0.963] [0.783] [0.857] [0.875]    
Within party pivotality 7.235*** 7.645*** 7.839*** 8.259*** 
  [1.464] [1.520] [1.764] [2.120]    
Proportionality -2.728 3.412 3.143 2.82 
[3.778] [2.616] [2.444] [2.552]    
Proportionality^2 57.903 -63.326 -51.231 -41.455 
[80.025] [51.966] [48.515] [51.526]    
Within party pivotality 3.79 7.935*** 8.021*** 8.173*** 
  [2.987] [2.087] [2.066] [2.267]    
Political competition 13.048 22.708 20.283 11.368 
[17.132] [17.658] [34.850] [19.120]    
(Political competition)^2 -825.825 -1698.355 -1535.205 -648.009 
[1323.135] [1478.083] [3090.007] [1842.541] 
Within party pivotality 5.702*** 6.129*** 6.183*** 6.965*** 
  [1.284] [1.274] [1.417] [1.638]    
Notes: Unit of observation is party-election. Standard errors are in brackets (clustered at municipality level). Significance is 
denoted by asterisks: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
